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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MICHIGAN'S 
GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL VERDICT 
In 1975, the Michigan Code of Criminal Procedure was amended 
to provide that the trier of fact may find a criminal defendant 
"guilty but mentally i11" (GBMl). 1 As a result, a criminal defendant 
in Michigan may now be found either guilty, not guilty, GBMI, or 
"not guilty by reason of insanity" (NGRI). 2 Under this scheme, 
criminal defendants who have committed an offense should be 
found GBMI if mentally ill but not legally insane; those who are 
legally insane should be found NGRI. 
The GBMI verdict is without precedent either in Michigan or in 
other jurisdictions. 3 The decision in People v. M cQuillan 4 provided 
the direct impetus for the enactment of the GBMI statute. 5 The 
McQuillan court construed Michigan's automatic commitment sta-
tute6 as requiring a hearing before commitment to determine if one 
found NGRI were presently insane. 7 The court also required that 
hearings be held to determine the present sanity of all those au-
tomatically committed prior to the McQuillan decision. Respond-
ing to the concern that these hearings were resulting in the release 
of dangerous people, 8 the Michigan legislature promptly adopted 
the GBMI provision. 
This article will assess the constitutionality of the statute provid-
ing for a GBMI verdict by examining the likely, impact of this sta-
1 MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 768.36 (West Supp. 1977). A defendant may be found GBMI 
only if he has asserted a defense of insanity. See note 64 and accompanying text infra. 
2 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.29a(2) (West Supp. 1977). 
3 People v. McLeod, No. 76-01672, slip op. at 10 (Recorder's Court of Detroit), rev' d, 77 
Mich. App. 327,258 N.W. 2d 214 (1977). The "guilty but insane" verdict in England, unlike 
the GBMI verdict, was one of acquittal. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 886 (2d ed. 1969). 
4 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W. 2d 569 (1974). 
5 MICH. HOUSE LEG. ANALYSIS SECTION, THIRD ANALYSIS OF MICH. H.B. 4363, 78th 
Leg. (July 15, 1975); Note, Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historical and Constitutional Analy-
sis, 53 J. URB. L. 471, 483 (1976). 
• MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 767.27b (1968) (repealed 1974) provided: "Any person, who 
is tried for a crime and is acquitted by the court or jury by reason of insanity, shall be com-
mitted immediately by order of the court to the department of mental health for treatment in 
an appropriate state hospital .... " 
7 The NGRI verdict requires a determination that the defendant was insane as of the time 
of the crime. McQuillan required that present insanity also be determined before one found 
NGRI is committed. 
8 Within a year after the McQuillan decision, 64 inmates were released from state hospi-
tals having been found presently sane. Two of those released later committed violent crimes. 
Note, supra note 5, at 471-72. 
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tute on the constitutional rights of legally insane defendants. 9 Part I 
will briefly outline the relevant provisions of the GBMI statute. 
Part II will consider whether legally insane defendants have a con-
stitutional right to an insanity defense. Part III will then argue that 
some defendants, though legally insane at the time they committed 
allegedly criminal acts, will nevertheless be found GBMI rather 
than NGRI. 
I. PROVISIONS OF THE "GUILTY BUT 
MENTALLY ILL" STATUTE 
A defendant may be found GBMI if the trier of fact determines 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of an of-
fense, was mentally ill at the time he committed the offense, but 
was not legally insane at the time he committed the offense. 10 In 
addition'to creating the GBMI verdict, the Michigan legislature has 
provided statutory definitions of the terms "mental illness" and 
"legal insanity. " 11 Mental illness is defined as "a substantial dis-
order of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, 
behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the 
ordinary demands oflife." 1 2 A person is legally insane "if, as a re-
sult of mental illness [as statutorily defined], or as a result of men-
• This article will not consider two other constitutional attacks that have been aimed at 
certain aspects of the GBMI statute. First, the article will not discuss the arguments inspired 
by the provision requiring that if a defendant found GBMI is placed on probation, "[t]he 
period of probation shall not be for less than 5 years and shall not be shortened without re-
ceipt and consideration of a forensic psychiatric report by the sentencing court." M1cH. 
CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 768.36(4) (West Supp. 19n). In People v. McLeod, No. 76-01672 (Re-
corder's Court of Detroit), rev' d, 77 Mich. App. 327, 258 N .W. 2d 214 (1977), the trial court 
found that this provision denied those found GBMI equal protection of the laws because 
those convicted under general guilty verdicts face no similar minimum probation term. It has 
been argued, however, that tho,se found GBMI are not similarly situated to those found 
guilty and may thus be treated differently. Brief for Appellant at 8, People v. McLeod, 77 
Mich. App. 327, 258 N.W. 2d 214 (1977). 
Second, this article will not discuss the treatment provisions of the GBMI statute, MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 768.36(3) (West Supp. 1977). In McLeod, the trial court held that the 
defendant had a statutory and constitutional right to adequate treatment. The trial court 
found, however, that the defendant would not receive the treatment to which he was entitled 
under the statute if placed in prison, and that the likelihood of transfer to the Department of 
Mental Health was small. Thus, the court held MCLA § 768.36(3) to be legally "inert," be-
cause compliance with its treatment provisions was impossible due to inadequate facilities in 
the Michigan Corrections and Mental Health Departments. In reversing, the court of appeals 
found that "matters relating to post-sentence treatment, or lack of treatment, [ were] prema-
turely raised" since the defendant had not yet been sentenced. 77 Mich. App. at 330, 258 
N .W. 2d at 216. 
10 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(1) (West Supp. 1977). 
11 The definition of legal insanity is contained in the public act that also provides for the 
GBMI verdict: 1975 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 180, § I, Eff. Aug. 6, 1975. The definition of men-
tal illness is contained in 1975 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 179, § I, Eff. Aug. 6, 1975. Neither 
Public Act 180 nor Public Act 179 would have taken effect unless both were enacted into law. 
12 MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 330.1400a (1977). 
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tal retardation [as statutorily defined], 13 that person lacks substan-
tial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. " 14 
Under current Michigan law, a defendant found NGRI is im-
mediately committed to the custody of the Center for Forensic 
Psychiatry for not more than sixty days. 15 The Center evaluates 
the defendant's present mental condition, and reports to the court 
on whether he meets the criteria for civil commitment. 16 After a 
judicial hearing, the defendant is either committed or discharged. 17 
By contrast, a defendant found GBMI is to be given such treat-
ment as is indicated for any present mental illness. 18 In addition, the 
GBMI defendant receives a sentence that could be imposed upon a 
defendant who was simply found "guilty" of the same offense. If 
sentenced to a prison term, the GBMI defendant "is committed to 
the custody of the department of corrections [for] further evalua-
tion [and] such treatment as is psychiatrically indicated." 19 If 
treatment is found necessary, it may be provided by the Correc-
tions Department, or by the Department of Mental Health, 20 al-
though a defendant discharged from the Department of Mental 
Health is returned to the Department of Corrections to serve the 
balance of his sentence. 2 1 If the GBMI defendant is placed on pro-
bation, "the trial judge, upon recommendation of the center for 
forensic psychiatry, shall make treatment a condition of proba-
tion. " 22 
The degree of criminal culpability required for one found GBMI 
is the same as that required for one found "guilty. " Although the 
"but mentally ill" portion of the verdict seeks to control disposi-
tion, to a great extent it merely duplicates pre-existing statutes that 
provide psychiatric evaluations and mental health services for all 
convicted persons. 23 Consequently, the GBMI verdict is substan-
13 
" 'Mentally retarded' means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning 
which originates during the developmental period and is associated with impairment in adap-
tive behavior." MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1500(g) (1975). 
14 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.21a (West Supp. 1977). Michigan's definition of legal 
insanity is substantially the same as that found in § 4.01(1) of the ALI Model Penal Code, 
which provides: "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate 
the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law." 
15 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2050 (1977). 
16 These criteria are set forth in MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 330.1401, .1515 (1977). 
17 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 330.2050 (1977). 
1 
• Id. § 768.36(3). 
19 Id. § 768.36(3). 
20 Transfer of prisoners from corrections facilities to mental health facilities may be made 
pursuant to MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.2000 (1977). 
21 Id. § 768.36(3). 
22 Id. § 768.36(4). 
23 See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 791.267, 330.2000 (1977). See also Schwartz, 
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tially the same as the "guilty" verdict, since the consequences to 
the defendant may be identical whether he is convicted under one 
verdict or the other. At most, the GBMI verdict may help ensure 
that convicted defendants who need treatment for mental illness 
will receive it.24 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO AN 
INSANITY DEFENSE 
By offering juries the GBMI verdict,the Michigan legislature has 
effectively deprived some legally insane defendants of an insanity 
defense.25 This deprivation is unconstitutional if an insanity de-
fense is constitutionally required. 
A. Due Process Considerations 
The United States Supreme Court has never clearly decided 
whether an insanity defense is constitutionally mandated.26 The 
two state supreme courts that have considered this issue, however, 
have held that it would be unconstitutional to abolish the insanity 
defense.27 In State v. Strasburg, 28 a statute providing that insanity 
is no defense to a criminal charge was held by the Washington Su-
preme Court to violate the due process clause of the state constitu-
tion, 29 a clause virtually identical to the one contained in the fed-
eral constitution. 30 The court reasoned that criminal intent is a re-
Moving Backward Confidently, 54 M1cH. B.J. 847, 848-49 (1975); Letter from Laurence Gil-
bert to state Senator Basil W. Brown (June 3, 1975) (contained in Michigan House Judiciary 
Committee file for House Bill 4363 (1975)). 
24 But see note 9 supra. 
25 See notes 59 - 75 and accompanying text infra. 
28 Dershowitz, Abolishing the Insanity Defense: The Most Significant Feature of the Ad-
ministration's Proposed Criminal Code - An Essay, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 434,437 (1973). The 
Court's failure to directly address this issue may be explained by the fact that insanity is 
presently recognized as a defense in every state. Note, Constitutional Limitations on Al-
locating the Burden of Proof of Insanity to the Defendant in Murder Cases, 56 B.U. L. REv. 
499, 499 n.2 (1976). Moreover, few attempts have ever been made to abolish the defense. See 
notes 27-33 and accompanying text infra. 
27 A third state supreme court decision, State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929), 
considered a Louisiana statute providing that upon a plea of insanity, a lunacy commission 
had absolute power to determine whether the defendant was presently insane or was insane 
when the offense was committed. The court held that the defense of insanity must be tried 
by a jury. 
28 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1021 (1910). 
29 WASH. CoNST. art. 1, § 3 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law." 
30 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ I provides in relevant part: "[N]or shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .... " 
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quired element of any crime, and that an insane person is incapable 
of forming the requisite intent. Similarly, in Sinclair v. State, 31 the 
Mississippi Supreme Court held that a statute abolishing the insan-
ity defense in murder cases violated the state due process provi-
sion, 32 which also is nearly identical to the federal due process 
clause. A concurring judge concluded that the challenged statute 
also violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
federal constitution. 33 
History supports the view that due process includes the right to 
an insanity defense. From the earliest period of the common law, 
insanity has been recognized as a complete defense to a criminal 
charge.34 Thus, the defense was firmly established by the time the 
United States Constitution was adopted, and has remained a fun-
damental part of American criminal law.35 The due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment was intended in part to protect cer-
tain fundamental rights long recognized under the common law.36 
Thus, because it is so basic to the American legal system,37 the in-
sanity defense is arguably protected by the fourteenth amendment. 
B. Lack of Mens Rea 
A further argument supporting the view that the insanity defense 
is of constitutional magnitude is that legally insane persons are in-
capable of possessing the criminal intent or mens rea constitution-
ally essential to a finding of guilt.38 However, courts disagree as to 
3
' 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931) (per curiam). 
32 MISS. CoNsT. art. 3, § 14 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property except by due process of law." 
33 161 Miss. at 164-69, 132 So. at 586-87 (Ethridge, J., concurring). 
34 State v. Strasbourg, 60 Wash. 106, 107, ll0 P. 1021, 1022 (1910). Absolute "madness" 
began to be recognized as a complete defense to a criminal charge during the fourteenth cen-
tury in England. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 851 (2d ed. 1969). 
35 A. GoLDSTEI.N, THE INSANITY DEFENSE ll (1967). See note 26 supra. 
36 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65 (1932); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328,333 (1916). In 
Powell, the Court observed: 
One test which has been applied to determine whether due process of law has 
been accorded in given instances is to ascertain what were the settled usages and 
modes of proceeding under the common and statute law of England before the 
Declaration of Independence, subject, however, to the qualification that they be 
shown not to have been unsuited to the civil and political conditions of our ances-
tors by having been followed in this country after it became a nation. 
287 U.S. at 65. 
37 fohnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 372 n. 9 (l972)(Powell, J. concurring); Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Justice Harlan, dissenting in Duncan, states that the critical 
factor is not that a particular right is found in the Bill of Rights, but that it is deemed to be 
fundamental. 391 U.S. at 179. 
38 See State v. Strasbourg, 60 Wash. 106, ll0 P. 1021 (1910); H. WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A 
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whether insanity and mens rea can co-exist. Insanity may be viewed 
either as evidence casting doubt on the mental element of an of-
fense, or as a kind of affirmative defense. Arguably these two posi-
tions are mutually exclusive, because without the element of mens 
rea there would be no crime and no need for an insanity defense. 39 
Despite the incompatibility of these two views of insanity, there 
are court decisions supporting each. 
The first view is suggested by Davis v. United States, 40 where 
the Court, quoting Blackstone, said: " 'So that to constitute a 
crime against human laws, there must be, first, a vicious will; and, 
secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will.' " 41 
The Davis Court concluded that insanity and mens rea cannot co-
exist. Many later federal and state courts have reiterated this con-
clusion. 42 
The second view is suggested by Leland v. Oregon, 43 where the 
Court stated that the Davis holding was only a prudential rule for 
federal courts and not a constitutional doctrine. The Court went on 
to sustain a conviction under an Oregon procedure whereby the de-
fendant, in order to successfully assert the insanity defense, was 
required to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Under 
this procedure the jury could find that the facts constituting a 
crime, including the mental element, were established and yet also 
find that the defendant was legally insane. Thus, contrary to Davis, 
the Leland holding implies that mens rea and insanity can co-exist. 
Some recent court opinions contain similar language.44 
DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 427 (1933). Certain "strict liability" or "negligent" crimes are 
clearly constitutional, although they require no finding of mens rea. Still, it is possible that 
mens rea is a required element of, at least, traditional common law offenses. See generally 
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
39 Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense" - Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853, 
862-63 (1963). But see note 38 supra. 
40 HiO U.S. 469 (1895). 
41 Id. at 484. 
•• E.g., United States v. McCracken, 488 F. 2d 406,409 (5th Cir. 1974) ('The defendant's 
sanity is always an element of the offense charged."); Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F. 
2d 50, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("Thus, an insane person who does the act is not guilty of the 
crime."); Hartford v. United States, 362 F.2d 63, 64 (9th Cir. 1966) ("A person who is noi 
legally sane at the time the act was committed may not be convicted of a crime for commit-
ting that act."); Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. l, 15, 268 A. 2d 89, 91 (1970) (Roberts, J ., 
concurring) ("I therefore cannot agree with the assertion that '[a]n individual may intention-
ally kill someone, with malice aforethought,' even though he is legally insane, i.e., legally 
incapable of forming the intention."); People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9,21 (1868) ("[T)here can 
be no criminal intent when the mental condition of the party accused is such that he is incap-
able of forming one."). 
43 343 U .s. 790 (1952). 
•• E.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 706 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("[T]he 
existence or nonexistence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the existence 
or nonexistence of the required mental elements of the crime."); Patterson v. New York, 
432 U.S. 197, 206 (1977) ("[O)nce the facts constituting a crime are established beyond area-
sonable doubt, based on all the evidence including the evidence of the defendant's mental 
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The judicial disagreement over whether mens rea and insanity 
can co-exist may stem in part from differing definitions of mens 
rea. This term may connote that criminal culpability requires a 
guilty mind or a vicious will, or it may be understood merely to de-
fine the specific mental state necessary to constitute a crime. 45 
As a practical matter, it is clear that, at a minimum, the presence 
of insanity substantially overlaps with the absence of the mental 
state essential to crime. This overlap is most plainly evident in 
states that require the issue of insanity to be tried separately from 
the issue of guilt. In these states, the evidence admissible at the 
hearing on guilt to show the defendant's mental state at the time of 
the crime is substantially the same as the evidence admissible at 
the hearing on the defendant's sanity.46 
A precise statement of the relationship between legal insanity 
and mens rea is beyond the scope of this article. These concepts 
are so intertwined, however, that if mens rea is a constitutionally 
required element of criminal offenses, then a legally insane defen-
dant has a constitutional right to be acquitted. The Supreme Court 
has suggested that mens rea is constitutionally required. In Patter-
son v. New York, 47 the Court was confronted with a New York sta-
tute48 that required a murder defendant, in order to limit conviction. 
to manslaughter, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. In 
an earlier case, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 49 the Court had held uncon-
stitutional a Maine statute requiring a person accused pf murder to 
prove that he acted in the heat of passion to rebut the statutory pre-
sumption of "malice aforethought." The Court reasoned in Mul-
laney that the Maine scheme improperly shifted to the defendant 
the burden of disproving a fact essential to the offense charged. 50 
In Patterson, however, the Court upheld the challenged statute be-
cause it did not expressly list malice aforethought as an element of 
state, the State may refuse to sustain the affinnative defense of insanity unless demonstrated 
by a preponderance of the evidence."); United States ex rel. Tate v. Powell, 325 F. Supp. 
333, 335 (1971) ("[Tihere is no constitutional interdiction that would prevent a state from 
fashioning its own rule whereby sanity is not an ingredient of the crime, but is instead an 
affirmative defense designed to avoid punishment."). 
45 See Note, Mens Rea and Insanity, 28 ME. L. REv. 500 (1977). 
46 Louisell & Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 805 
(1961); Weihofen, Procedure for Determining Defendant's Mental Condition Under the 
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 235, 245 (1956). The authors of 
the former article conclude that the separate trial procedure in California "was based on an 
inaccurate premise of law. It assumed that the issue of guilt and the issue of mental condition 
are separable. We submit that reason shows they are not separable, and that experience con-
firms this conclusion." Louisell & Hazard, supra at 830. 
47 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
48 N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 125.25 (McKinney). 
49 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
50 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
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murder and thus did not require the defendant to negate any ele-
ment of the crime. 
Justice Powell, dissenting in Patterson, asserted that the only 
"facts" that the majqrity found necessary to constitute a crime are 
those that appear on the face of the statute as a part of the defini-
tion of the crime. 51 Justice Powell hypothesized that, under the 
majority opinion, a state could define murder as mere physical con-
tact between the defendant and the victim leading to the victim's 
death, and could require the defendant to prove an absence of 
culpable mens rea as an affirmative defense. 52 Justice Powell 
stated, however, that he had "no doubt that the Court would find 
some way to strike down a formalistically correct statute as egregi-
ous as the one hypothesized. " 53 Indeed, the majority opinion ob-
served that "there are obviously constitutional limits beyond 
which the States may not go" in labeling elements of crimes as af-
firmative defenses. 54 Prior to Patterson, one commentator examin-
ing recent Supreme Court decisions concluded that the Constitu-
tion imposes a requirement of mens rea. 55 The Court has never 
clearly determined which crimes require a mental element, 56 but 
clearly the Court would invalidate a legislative attempt to eliminate 
mens rea as an element of all crimes. 57 This conclusion suggests 
that the Court would likewise invalidate any legislative attempt to 
abolish the insanity defense, since it bears so directly upon the 
element of mens rea. 58 
Abolition of an insanity defense would most likely be unconstitu-
tional. Therefore, the GBMI statute is unconstitutional if it effec-
tively deprives some defendants of their constitutional right to an 
insanity defense. It will be argued below that jury confusion caused 
by the GBMI statute will result in GBMI verdicts for so,me defen-
dants who were legally insane when they committed allegedly crim-
inal acts. 
Ill. EFFECT OF THE GBMI STATUTE 
A. Confusion 
When the trier of fact is a jury, it is likely that some defendants 
will be convicted under a GBMI verdict who, in the absence of a 
5
' 432 U.S. at 221-22. 
52 Id. at 224 n.8. 
53 Id. at 225 n.9. 
54 Id. at 210. 
55 Tushnet, Constitutional Limitation of Substantive Criminal Law: An Examination of 
the Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 8.U.L. REv. TI5 (1975). 
56 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952). 
51 See H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 478 (1954). 
58 See notes 38-46 and accompanying text supra. 
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GBMI option, would have been acquited under a NGRI verdict. 59 
This is because a jury is likely to confuse the GBMI standard of 
mental illness with the NGRI standard of legal insanity. 
The statutory definitions of legal insanity and mental illness 
overlap substantially. To be found GBMI, a defendant must have 
been mentally ill, but not legally insane, when he committed the 
offense. 60 Yet it is hard to imagine "a substantial disorder of 
thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, 
capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary 
demands of life' '6 1 that may not also be a substantial incapacity 
"either to appreciate the wrongfulness of ... conduct or to con-
form ... conduct to the requirements of law.' '62 
General mental illness in many cases can be easily distinguished 
from legal insanity. For example, one suffering from kleptomania 
may still be able to conform his conduct to the law prohibiting 
rape.63 On the other hand, legal insanity and the mental illness re-
quired for the GBMI verdict may be very difficult to distinguish; 
the question of whether a kleptomaniac was legally insane or 
merely mentally ill when he committed a theft offense is an ex-
tremely close one. Yet it is precisely these close questions that 
juries considering a GBMI verdict will have to answer. Impor-
tantly, a jury can only render a GBMI verdict if the defendant has 
asserted an insanity defense64 and thus has raised the issue of his 
ability to control the specific conduct forming the basis of the 
charged offense. In effect, a defendant asserting a defense of insan-
ity "triggers" the guilty but mentally ill verdict and submits the 
issue of the degree of his mental impairment to the jury. 
Given the confusion engendered by the enormous overlap be-
tween the definitions of mental illness and legal insanity, the likeli-
hood is strong that juries will return GBMI verdicts instead of 
NGRI verdicts. By convicting the defendant, the jury can condemn 
his behavior and keep a potentially dangerous individual in cus-
tody. However, by also finding the defendant mentally ill, the jury 
may believe that their verdict will ensure special treatment for 
bim65 and will carry a lesser stigma than a regular "guilty" verdict. 
•• It is also possible that some defendants will be convicted under GBMI verdicts who 
otherwise would have been found "guilty". This possibility raises no constitutional ques-
tions, however, since the GBMI verdict is substantially the same as the "guilty" verdict. 
See notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text supra. 
60 See note 10 and accompanying text supra. 
61 This is the statutory definition of mental illness. See note 12 and accompanying text 
supra. 
62 This is the statutory definition of legal insanity. See note 14 and accompanying text 
supra. 
63 United States v. Brawner, 471 F. 2d 969, 9'Jl (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
64 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(l)(West Supp. 1977). 
65 But see notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text supra. 
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Observations of experimental juries have revealed that a GBMI 
option is exactly the type of "middle ground" between the verdicts 
of "guilty" and NGRI that many jurors would prefer.66 Especially 
in serious cases, jurors understandably may be hesitant to accept 
the insanity defense, 67 since to do so might result in the defen-
dant's release from custody .68 The GBMI verdict allows the jury to 
distinguish the defendant from the ordinary "guilty" criminal, 
while ensuring that the defendant's conduct will be condemned. 
Studies further suggest that jury discussions commonly center 
on what will happen to the defendant as the result of a given ver-
dict. 69 Michigan juries are entitled to instructions before they de-
liberate that a verdict of NGRI may result in the defendant's early 
discharge from custody. 70 It is highly likely that instructions on the 
consequences of the GBMI verdict will also be given. 71 Thus, the 
jurors may be told that a GBMI verdict will always result in treat-
ment coupled with incarceration or probation. Knowledge that the 
66 R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 178 (1967). The tendency of 
jurors to compromise their differences is clearly evident in cases involving lesser included 
offenses. Where only one offense is charged, the jury may consider themselves faced with 
an all-or-nothing choice between conviction and acquittal. Where two or three offenses are 
charged, however, the jury may opt for a middle ground by convicting for a lesser offense. 
Such compromise could occur either where jurors who favor conviction on a greater offense 
split their differences with jurors who favor acquittal, or where the jury simply takes the 
easier course of compromise rather than fully debating the defendant's guilt or innocence of 
all the offenses charged. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331 (1970); United States v. 
Harary, 457 F.2d 471, 479 (2d Cir. 1972); People v. Gessinger, 238 Mich. 625, 628-29, 214 
N.W. 184, 185 (1927). Just as a lesser included offense gives the jury a third, intermediate 
choice besides conviction of a greater offense and outright acquittal, the GBMI verdict pro-
vides the jury with a compromise between the verdicts of "guilty" and NGRI. 
67 Buzynski v. Oliver, 538 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1976). 
68 See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra. 
69 Weihofen, Procedure For Determining Defendant's Mental Condition Under The 
American Law Institute' s Model Penal Code, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 235, 247 (1956). Professor 
Weihofen here discusses the results of a jury project conducted by the University of Chicago 
Law School. 
70 People v. Martin, 386 Mich. 407, 192 N.W. 2d 215 (1971); People v. Cole, 382 Mich. 695, 
172 N.W. 2d 354 (1969). The instruction suggested by MICH. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 7:8:07 
(1977) implies, and the alternative instruction specifically states, "[i]f, after a hearing before 
the Probate Court, the defendant is found not to be mentally ill or not to be a person requir-
ing treatment, the defendant shall be discharged [from custody]." MICH. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 
7:8:08 (1977). 
71 In People v. Cole, 382 Mich. 695, 172 N.W. 2d 354 (1969), the court concluded that 
juries would not otherwise understand how the defendant would be affected by an NGRI 
verdict, and therefore held that the jury may be informed of the consequences of this ver-
dict. The reasoning in Cole is equally applicable to a GBMI verdict. Additionally, MICH. 
CRIM. JURY INSTR. 7:8:10(15) (1977) suggests that the following instruction be given: 
In most respects a verdict of guilty but mentally ill is the same as a verdict of guilty. 
The def~ndant may be imprisoned for the same period of time as he would if he 
were found guilty. [Alternatively, he could be placed on probation for a period of 
time the same as or greater than he would be if found guilty.] The distinction is that 
the verdict of guilty but mentally ill imposes upon the Department of Corrections 
an obligation to provide appropriate psychiatric treatment during the period of im-
prisonment or while the defendant is on probation. 
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defendant will not go completely free probably increases the attrac-
tiveness of the GBMI verdict. 72 
B. Arbitrariness 
A GBMI statute is not necessary to ensure that convicted per-
sons will receive treatment for mental illness. Michigan statutes in 
existence before the enactment of the GBMI statute already re-
quired that mental health services be provided to convicted per-
sons. 73 If the Michigan Legislature was convinced that juries 
should decide who needs treatment for mental illness, it could have 
established some type of bifurcated procedure whereby the issue of 
mental illness would not be resolved by the jury simultaneously 
with the issue of "guilt". The effect of the present scheme, how-
ever, is that some defendants who would have been acquited as 
legally insane under prior law will now be convicted under GBMI 
verdicts74 because of unnecessary jury confusion. 
The effect of the GBMI statute is to invite Michigan juries to 
choose between NGRI and GBMI verdicts to determine disposi-
tion. The confusion engendered by the overlap between the defini-
tions of mental illness and legal insanity will result in verdicts of 
GBMI in cases where the defendant would otherwise have been 
found NGRI if no GBMI option existed. 75 As such, the GBMI sta-
tute seriously conflicts with the insanity defense. By retaining that 
defense despite the enactment of the GBMI statute, the legislature 
signified that it still finds it socially valuable not to hold insane per-
sons responsible for criminal acts. However, the GBMI verdict will 
effectively deprive some legally insane persons of their statutory 
and constitutional right to an acquittal by reason of insanity. 
72 Weihofen, supra note 69, at 247. Professor Weihofen reports that many jurors who are 
disposed toward insanity verdicts are persuaded to change their minds by the argument that 
a defendant declared to be insane would go "scot free." 
73 See note 23 and accompanying text supra. 
1
• See notes 59-72 and accompanying text supra. 
75 The Michigan Legislature may have intended to give juries precisely this discretion. A 
proposal by Professor Perkins for a "guilty but insane" verdict was contained in the Michi-
gan House Judiciary Committee file for House Bill 4363 (1975), which later became 1975 
Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 180. Professor Perkins has suggested that such a verdict would allow 
juries to convict defendants who nevertheless should not suffer the penalty normally pro-
vided for the offense. Thus, the jury would not be forced to "acquit one who is obviously 
guilty." R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 887-88 (2d ed. 1969). The Michigan Legislature was 
most likely not concerned about ensuring treatment for mentally ill defendants when it pass-
ed the GBMI statute. The statute does not ask a jury to determine a defendant's present 
mental condition and need for treatment. To support a GBMI verdict, the statute requires 
that the jury must find the defendant mentally ill, but not legally insane, at the time of the 
commission of the offense. Thus, the apparent purpose of the GBMI statute was to encour-
age juries to opt for GBMI verdicts so as to ensure that dangerous people would remain in 
custody. See note 8 and accompanying text supra. 
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A OBMI verdict is nearly identical in its consequences to a ver-
dict of "guilty". The confusion stemming from the overlap be-
tween the statutory definitions of "mental illness" and "legal in-
sanity" and the tendency of jurors to compromise are certain to 
cause some legally insane defendants to be found OBMI. Con-
sequently, the OBMI statute will deprive these legally insane de-
fendants not only of their statutory rights but also of their colorable 
constitutional right to acquittal. For this reason, the OBMI statute 
violates the due process clause of the United States Constitution. 
Invalidating the OBMI statute need not result in the release of 
dangerous mentally ill persons. Since under current law, the au-
tomatic commitment following a NORI verdict is only temporary, 
prosecutors have more incentive than in the past to contest insan-
ity defenses vigorously. Thus, inappropriate NORI verdicts should 
occur less often. 76 Appropriate NORI verdicts may still result, 
after a hearing, in civil commitment of the defendant for an appro-
priate period. 
-John M. Grostic 
76 Letter from Laurence Gilbert, supra note 23. 

